We propose and test a form of bias in earnings forecasts that arises from analysts' desire to be perceived as accurate. Our hypothesis suggests that an analyst with a buy (sell) recommendation has an incentive to report a downward (upward) biased earnings estimate so that the company is more (less) likely to beat the consensus forecast and experience an earnings surprise that appears "in line" with the analyst's outstanding stock recommendation. Consistent with this prediction, we find that stock recommendations prior to earnings announcements significantly and positively predict subsequent earnings forecast errors, and that this predictability is concentrated in situations where the motivation for such strategic behavior is particularly strong. Together, the results provide evidence that the desire to appear accurate does not always lead to more accurate forecasts.
Introduction
Sell-side analysts play an integral role in financial markets. They collect, process, and transmit information to market participants, who in turn use analysts' reports to guide their investment decisions (e.g., Stickel (1995) ; Womack (1996) ; Kothari (2001) ; Jegadeesh et al. (2004) ). These reports, on which investors rely, may not reflect analysts' true beliefs, however. Analysts are known to have an incentive to bias their reports (and the earnings forecasts and stock recommendations so transmitted) to stimulate trading (e.g., Hayes (1998)) , to obtain value-relevant information from management (e.g., Lim (2001) ), to generate investment banking business (e.g., Michaely and Womack (1999) ), and/or to keep prices of the stocks their brokerage firm owns artifically high. 1
In this study, we propose and test a very different source of intentional bias. In particular, we suggest that analysts sometimes choose to report biased earnings forecasts in order to better "align" the subsequent earnings surprises with their outstanding stock recommendations. To illustrate, consider an analyst with a strong buy recommendation, i.e., one, who believes that the market severely undervalues the firm in question. If the firm subsequently misses its consensus earnings forecast, this could be construed as contradicting the analyst's bullish view on the company and raise questions about the analyst's competency. The consistency between the analyst's recommendation and subsequent earnings surprise could be particularly relevant to the analyst's reputation and future career given that there is no clear rule as to the horizon over which and the benchmark against which stock recommendation performance should be evaluated. 2 To hedge against such risk, an analyst with a positive recommendation can introduce a negative bias, relative to his true belief, into his reported earnings forecast so that the company is more likely to meet or beat the 1 A related literature suggests that analysts do not process information efficiently, i.e., they either under-or overreact to information, and unintentionally issue "biased" earnings forecasts and recommendations (see Section 2.2 in Daniel et al. (2002) for a review of this literature).
2 In untabulated analyses, we relate the fraction of "inconsistent" stock recommendations with measures of analyst career outcomes that have been proposed by prior literature. In particular, we find that, after controlling for earnings forecast accuracy,analysts in the bottom quintile ranked by the fraction of inconsistent recommendations in a year is 4.8% (p<0.05) more likely to be demoted from a large brokerage house to a smaller one in the following year, and is 4.9% (p<0.1) less likely to be promoted.
consensus forecast and experience a positive earnings surprise; relatedly, when the analyst has a bearish recommendation outstanding, he can introduce a positive bias into his reported earnings forecast so that the company is more likely to miss the consensus forecast and experience a negative earnings surprise.
To test our hypothesis, we obtain data on earnings forecasts and stock recommendations from the Institutional Brokers' Estimate System (IBES) database. We then examine whether recommendations issued prior to a firm's earnings announcement predict individual analysts' subsequent earnings forecast errors, which we define as the difference between the reported earnings-per-share and the most recent earnings-per-share forecasts, scaled by lagged price.
Our results are consistent with sell-side analysts exhibiting the here proposed forecasting behavior. After controlling for variables known to relate to analysts' recommendations and earnings forecast errors, we find that an analyst's recommendation issued at least three months before the earnings announcement strongly predicts his subsequent earnings forecast error. Specifically, a onenotch increase in an analyst's outstanding recommendation is associated with a 27 basis point (bp) increase in price-scaled earnings forecast error (t-statistic=3.52).
Because analysts' motivation to bias earnings forecasts stems from their capacity to move the consensus forecast upon which the earnings surprise is calculated, in our main analysis, we aggregate both earnings forecasts and recommendations to the firm level and test whether firms with more optimistic (pessimistic) recommendations subsequently experience more positive (negative) earnings surprises. 3 The tenor of our results remains. Sorting firms-years into terciles based on their average recommendation levels prior to the earnings announcement, we find that firm-years in the tercile with the most pessimistic recommenations, on average, experience a price-scaled earnings surprise of -11 bps; in comparison, firm-years in the tercile with the most optimistic recommendations experience a price-scaled earnings surprise of +2 bps. Taking the long-term average stock price of $35 per share from Weld, Thaler, and Benartzi (2009) , the difference of 13 bps (t-statistic=2.50) translates into a four-cent difference in earnings surprise between the top and bottom tercile. Correspondingly, we observe that the fraction of firm-years meeting or beating the analyst consensus forecast is 7% higher in the top tercile than in the bottom tercile (t-statistic=9.06 ). This result continues to hold within a regression framework (both OLS and median regressions) and with the inclusion of various controls for growth opportunities and earnings management.
Given the strong association observed between recommendation level and subsequent earnings surprise (and the fraction of firm-years meeting or beating the consensus forecast), it should not come as a surprise that the average recommendation significantly and positively predicts stock returns in a three-day window around the subsequent earnings announcement. The difference in Daniel et al. (1997) (DGTW) characteristic-adjusted earnings announcement day returns between the top and bottom terciles is 0.67% (t-statistic=4.95). 4 To further explore our interpretation of the results, we exploit potential determinants of the extent to which analysts bias their reported earnings forecasts. Any intentional bias introduced by a single analyst in his reported earnings forecast has a larger impact on the consensus forecast when analyst coverage is lower. In addition, when an analyst chooses to report a biased earnings estimate, other analysts with similar recommendations can free-ride on this analyst's decision. To the extent that the analyst with the distorted earnings forecast is the only one to bear the cost, the more analysts that are covering a firm, the less likely any one of them would report distorted earnings estimates. We thus predict that analysts are more likely to report distorted earnings estimates when a firm is followed by fewer analysts. Consistent with this prediction, we observe that the association between the average recommendation and subsequent earnings surprise significantly decreases with analyst coverage. Moreover, making the assumption that geographic proximity mitigates the coordination/free-rider problem, we partition firms based on whether the analysts covering the firm in question work for brokerage houses based in the same locale (i.e., the same Metropolitan Statistical Areas), and find that even after controlling for analyst coverage, the association between average recommendation and subsequent earnings surprise is stronger for firms covered (exclusively) by analysts from the same locale.
We also explore the role of valuation uncertainty. Our interpretation of the evidence so far is that analysts manage expectations in order to avoid earnings surprises that seemingly contradict their stock recommendations. That is, analysts with optimistic (pessimistic) recommendations worry that their firm subsequently experience a negative (positive) earnings surprise; they hedge against such risk by introducing a negative (positive) bias into their reported forecasts. Because firms with higher uncertainty have a wider range of potential earnings realizations, in order to "ensure" that these high-uncertainty firms meet (miss) the consensus forecast and experience a positive (negative) earnings surprise, analysts have to report more biased forecasts. Using firm size and stock return volatility as proxies for valuation uncertainty, we find evidence consistent with this conjecture. 5
Finally, we analyze recommendations of analysts revising their earnings forecasts shortly before the earnings announcement. Specifically, we examine cases where analysts downward-revise their forecasts, thereby lowering the consensus forecast and ex post producing a positive earnings surprise that, without the last-minute downward-revision, would have been a negative earnings surprise. Vice versa, we examine cases where analysts upward-revise their forecasts, thereby raising the consensus forecast and ex post producing a negative earnings surprise that, without the last-minute upwardrevision, would have been a positive earnings surprise. Consistent with our hypothesis, we find that the average level of recommendations of last-minute downward-revising analysts is higher than that of last-minute upward-revising analysts.
Overall, the findings presented in this paper are consistent with our proposed hypothesis: Analysts with optimistic (pessimistic) recommendations on a firm are concerned that the company subsequently experiences a negative (positive) earnings surprise, and hedge against such risk by introducing a negative (positive) bias into their reported forecasts.
There are alternative interpretations for parts of our findings. In particular, one may argue that firms with bullish recommendations are penalized more severely for missing their respective earnings targets (Abarbanell and Lehavy (2003) ). Consequently, managers from firms with bullish recommendations manage earnings upward and/or guide analysts' forecasts downward, while those with bearish recommendations decide to take big earnings baths. We label this alternative explanation the "earnings management" interpretation.
Relatedly, there is a growing body of research that examines how analysts compromise their objectivity and issue biased research reports in order to curry favor with firm managers. Lin and McNichols (1998) and Michaely and Womack (1999) , among others, suggest that analysts from brokerage houses that have underwriting relations with the firm in question ("affiliated" analysts) tend to issue more optimistic recommendations than their "unaffiliated" peers. Malmendier and Shanthikumar (2009) provide evidence that affiliated analysts with the most optimistic recommendations also issue the most pessimistic earnings forecasts. No such relation is found for unaffiliated analysts. We label this interpretation the "currying favor" hypothesis.
We attempt to differentiate our hypothesis from the earnings management/forecast guidance interpretation by explicitly controlling for discretionary accruals and proxies for earnings management/forecast guidance incentives, the inclusion of which has little impact on the partial correlation between recommendation and earnings surprise. Moreover, both the earnings-management/forecast guidance and currying-favor interpretations have no clear prediction on how the observed effect should vary with analyst coverage, analyst locale, and valuation uncertainty; they also are less likely to explain the association between negative earnings surprises and pessimistic recommendations. Regarding the currying favor interpretation, we find that our results continue to hold for the subset of analysts working for independent research firms, who presumably have less incentive to curry favor with management. Together, while both the earnings management/forecast guidance and the currying favor interpretations likely play a role in explaining parts of our findings, neither can explain the full set of results by itself, making our interpretation perhaps the most parsimonious.
As such, our paper may add to the set of frameworks that economists, investors, and regulators use to study analyst forecasting behavior and to examine information flows in financial markets.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 summarizes our data collection and screening procedures. Section 3 reports the results of our main analysis. Section 4 discusses alternative explanations and conducts robustness checks. Finally, Section 5 concludes.
Data
We obtain information regarding sell-side analyst recommendations and earnings forecasts from the Institutional Brokers Estimate System (IBES) detail recommendation file and the IBES unadjusted U.S. detail history file, respectively. The IBES recommendation file tracks all recommendations made by each analyst. Recommendations are standardized and converted to numerical scores ranging from 1 (strong buy) to 5 (strong sell). To facilitate the interpretation of our results, we reverse the IBES coding to 5 (strong buy), 4 (buy), 3 (hold), 2 (sell), and 1 (strong sell). A high value, thus, indicates a more bullish view. The IBES unadjusted detail history file tracks all earnings-per-share (EP S) forecasts made by each analyst (among other forecasts). Following prior literature (e.g., Teoh et al. (1998a,b) ), we define the consensus forecast as the average annual EP S forecast (across all forecasts issued in the three months prior to the earnings announcement); in robustness tests, we use the median earnings forecast as the consensus forecast and obtain very similar results. 6 The sample period spans from 1994 to 2010 and is determined by the availability of recommendation data in the IBES dataset.
We augment the IBES file with financial-statement and financial-market data from COMPUS-TAT and the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP), respectively. We also manually collect location information for the brokerage firms in our sample using a combination of Nelson's Directory 6 The consensus forecast reported on popular investment sites, such as Yahoo!Finance, MSN-Money, and WSJ, are all defined as the mean forecast. Consistent with investors paying more attention to the mean forecast than the median forecast, we find that the earnings-response coefficient (i.e., the association between earnings surprise and earnings-announcement-day return) is stronger when defining the consensus forecast as the mean forecast (results available upon request).
of Investment Research, Manta, D&B Million Dollar Database, and the brokerage firm's website.
Appendices A and B provide a full description of the variables used in this study. 7
In our analysis, we exclude firm observations with the most extreme 0.5% of standardized earnings surprise (SU E= actual EPS minus consensus earnings forecast scaled by lagged stock price).
Less conservative procedures of truncating the sample based on the most extreme 1% or 5% produce similar results with lower standard errors and higher statistical significance than the ones reported in this study. Our final sample comprises around 33,000 firm-year observations. Table I presents summary statistics of our main variables of interest. Consistent with prior literature, the median firm in our sample meets or beats its most recent consensus earnings forecast (the number of observations with positive or zero earnings surprises is 21,382; the number of observerations with negative earnings surprises is 11,623). In addition, the distribution of SU E is significantly negatively skewed, suggesting that firms sometimes choose to take big earnings baths when they are unable to meet the consensus forecast. Firms that meet or beat their consensus earnings forecast outperform those that miss their consensus forecast by a significant margin in a three-day window around the earnings announcement (1.31% vs. -1.83%).
The average market capitalization is $4.15 billion and the average book-to-market ratio is 0.56.
Compared to the CRSP-sample averages, these figures indicate that firms covered by analysts tend to be larger and more growth-oriented. Table I (Panel C) also shows the correlation matrix of the main variables used in the study. We find that the earnings surprise of a firm is positively correlated with the average recommendation outstanding prior to the earnings announcement.
7 In a recent study, Ljungqvist et al. (2009) detect that the IBES recommendations database downloaded at different points in time (but for the same sample period) yields different observations. Thomson Financial has for the most part purged the data. As of February 12th 2007, the data on Wharton Research Data Services (WRDS) reflect the corrections Glushkov (2007) .
Biases in Analysts' Earnings Forecasts
In this section, we motivate our empirical design and take our main hypothesis to the data. Our conjecture is that analysts with optimistic (pessimistic) recommendations sometimes choose to report negatively (positively) biased earnings estimates -relative to their true beliefs -so that the firm is more (less) likely to subsequently experience a positive (negative) earnings surprise. This proposed behavior stems from analysts' desire to be perceived as accurate/consistent and to avoid situations where the subsequent earnings surprise seemingly contradicts the analyst's recommendation outstanding, i.e. situations where a buy recommendation is followed by a negative earnings surprise and where a sell recommendation is followed by a positive earnings surprise. 8
In untabulated analyses, we find that analysts in the top quintile ranked by the fraction of "inconsistent" recommendations in a year, i.e., recommendations that are later "contradicted" by subsequent earnings surprises, are 4.8% (p<0.05) more likely to be demoted from a large brokerage house to a small one than their peers, and 4.9% (p<0.1) less likely to be promoted from a small brokerage house to a large one in the following year, where large brokerage houses are defined as the top ten percent of brokerage firms (in a given year) in terms of analysts employed.
Results at the Analyst Level
Empirical tests of our hypothesis face the challenge that we, as econometricians, do not observe analysts' true earnings estimates. Consider analyst j's forecast bias for firm i:
where e j,i,t+1 is analyst j's true earnings forecast, and e rep j,i,t+1 is his reported earnings forecast.
The goal of this study is to assess whether the unobserved difference between analyst j's reported 8 In a related vein, a large body of literature in economics and psychology suggests that people avoid disappointment by strategically altering their expecations about the desired outcome (e.g., Bell (1985) ; Van Dijk et al. (2003) ).
and true earnings forecast (F orecast Bias) varies systematically with his recommendation level.
One approach to circumvent this problem is to substitute the analyst's true earnings forecast, e j,i,t+1 , with the actual earnings per share (EPS), e i,t+1 . We can then test whether analysts with more optimistic (pessimistic) recommendations are more likely to have positive (negative) earnings forecast errors, e i,t+1 − e rep j,i,t+1 .
In particular, we conduct the following regression analysis at the analyst-firm-year level:
whereê rep j,i,t+1 is the most recent earnings forecast for firm i issued by analyst j within three months of the earnings announcement, and rec j,i,t is the latest stock recommendation issued by the same analyst at least three months and no more than fifteen months prior to the earnings announcement.
The fifteen-month filter serves to weed out "stale" recommendations. We impose the three-month filter to ensure that all information incorporated in recommendations is available when analysts issue their earnings forecasts. Note that we do not take a position on when exactly analysts start issuing biased earnings forecasts (for their recommendations issued in months [-15;-3] ). Analysts may do so simultaneous to their issuing the recommendations; alternatively, they may wait a few months to (better) evaluate the "need" to report biased earnings forecasts.
In our regression analysis, we scale Earnings F orecast Error by lagged price per share to address potential heteroscedasticity issues. We also include year-fixed effects in the regression to deal with changes in overall market conditions. Our main prediction is that β be significantly positive.
Our choice of control variables (Control ) in regression specification (2) is motivated by the observation that recommendations tend to be more optimistic for larger, growth firms with higher past stock returns, and that these firm characteristics may also be related to earnings forecast errors. For example, prior studies (e.g., Subramanyam and Wild (1996) ; Skinner and Sloan (2002); Abarbanell and Lehavy (2003) ) document that growth firms are penalized more severely than value firms for missing their respective earnings targets. Consequently, managers of growth firms have stronger incentives to manage earnings (e.g., through discretionary accruals) and/or guide analyst forecasts. To the extent that analysts do not fully anticipate this behavior and/or let their forecasts be guided, growth firms will be associated with both higher recommendations and more positive earnings forecast errors. Similar conjectures apply to larger firms and firms with higher past returns.
We include discretionary accruals in our regression to control for the effect of earnings management on earnings forecast errors. We also include variables intended to capture earnings management/forecast guidance incentives: lagged firm size, book-to-market ratio, and prior-year stock returns. In additional analyses, we include alternative controls for a firm's growth opportunities (investment ratio, price-to-earnings ratio, advertising expenditures), as well as past stock returns over various horizons; the results are very similar to the ones reported in this study. There may be other omitted variable issues that are not dealt with given the current set of controls. To keep the presentation uncluttered, we defer related discussions to Section 4.
The results, shown in Table II , are consistent with the hypothesis that sell-side analysts strategically report biased earnings forecasts. After controlling for the list of variables that are known to be related to analysts' recommendations and earnings forecast errors, an analyst's outstanding recommendation issued at least three months before the earnings announcement significantly and positively predicts his subsequent earnings forecast error. Specifically, a one-notch increase in the analyst's outstanding recommendation is associated with a 26.5 (t=3.52) basis point increase in the price-adjusted earnings forecast error.
We also conduct a logistic regression analysis with the dependent variable being an indicator function that takes the value of one if the earnings forecast error is non-negative and zero otherwise.
The coefficient estimate on the consensus recommenation variable implies that a one-notch increase in the outstanding recommendation is associated with a 0.85% (p=0.02) increase in the probability of a non-negative earnings forecast error. 9
Results at the Firm Level

Regression Specification
Because analysts' motivation to report biased earnings forecasts stems from their ability to affect the consensus forecast upon which the earnings surprise is calculated, in our main analysis, we aggregate both earnings forecasts and recommendations to the firm level, and examine whether firms with more optimistic (pessimistic) average recommendations subsequently experience more positive (negative) earnings surprises and announcement day returns. Specifically, we estimate the following regression equation with firm-year observations:
Earnings Surprise
where e rep i,t+1 is the consensus earnings forecast and rec i,t is the consensus recommendation level.
Similar to regression equation (2), we only consider the most recent earnings forecasts issued/updated within a three-month window preceding the earnings announcement when computing the consensus earnings forecast; relatedly, in constructing the average recommendation outstanding, we use the most recent recommendations issued/updated three to fifteen months prior to the earnings announcement: 10
Conducting our main analysis at the firm level also has important methodological advantages.
To see this, we decompose the dependent variable in regression equation (2) into a forecast-bias component, a true forecast-deviation component, and a true earnings surprise component:
Earnings F orecast Error
= e j,i,t+1 − e rep j,i,t+1
T rue Deviation + e i,t+1 − e i,t+1 .
T rue Surprise
The above equation is derived by simultaneously adding and subtracting e j,i,t+1 and e i,t+1 , where e j,i,t+1 is analyst j's true earnings forecast and e i,t+1 is the true consensus forecast.
The T rue Deviation term measures the deviation of an analyst's unbiased earnings forecast from that of the other analysts covering the same stock; the T rue Surprise term captures the difference between the actual EPS and true consensus forecast, which, under the assumption that analysts form rational beliefs, equals zero in expectations.
As revealed by equation (4), any observed correlation between Earnings F orecast Error and recommendation level reflects both the effect of recommendation level on forecast bias (F orecast Bias) and the effect of recommendation level on analyst's true deviation from the consensus belief (T rue Deviation).
We conjecture the former to be positive; the latter is negative because analysts with more positive recommendations likely also have more optimistic true beliefs about future earnings than their less positive counterparts. The coefficient β on recommendation in equation (2), which captures the joint effect of F orecast Bias and T rue Deviation, is thus biased downward. That is, while an analyst with a "strong buy" recommendation may report a negatively biased forecast relative to his true belief, because his true belief is higher than that of his peer with a "hold" recommendation on the same stock, the "strong buy" analyst's reported forecast may still be higher than that of the "hold" analyst even in the presence of strategically distorted forecasts.
The advantage of regression (3) is that, in aggregating Earnings F orecast Error to the firm level, we eliminate the T rue Deviation term from equation (4), as
That is, the positive association between analysts' recommendations and their relative views on subsequent earnings of any particular firm is washed out at the firm level. The firm-level equation (3) therefore allows for a cleaner test of the hypothesis we propose in this study. 11 In the following analyses, we use equation (3) as our baseline regression specification.
Results
The results presented in Table III are consistent with our hypothesis. The coefficient estimate on the firm's average recommendation level is both statistically and economically significant. Specifically, a one-notch upgrade in the consensus recommendation prior to the earnings announcement (e.g., from 3 (hold) to 4 (buy)) is associated with a 29-basis-point increase (t=3.47) in the price-scaled earnings surprise. The coefficient estimates on the control variables indicate that earnings surprises tend to be more positive for firms with more growth opportunities, higher past returns, and more positive discretionary accruals.
Table III also reports coefficient estimates from a binary response model with the logistic function. The dependent variable equals one if a firm meets or beats its consensus earnings forecast, and zero otherwise. The independent variables are the same as in equation ((3)). The results show 11 We discuss potential alternative interpretations of equation (3) in Section 4 in more detail.
a positive relation between the average recommendation level and the propensity to meet or beat consensus earnings forecasts. All else equal, a one-notch increase in the average recommendation level is associated with a 3.53% increase (p=0.00) in the likelihood of meeting or beating consensus forecasts, suggesting that our result is not driven by a small number of large negative earnings surprises. 12 Relatedly, when re-estimating equation ( (3)) within a median regression framework, we obtain a coefficient estimate of 0.008 (t=3.12) on the consensus recommendation variable.
As a natural extension, we repeat our analysis, but now replace the earnings-surprise variable with earnings announcement day returns. The basic prediction is that, if investors do not fully understand analysts' incentives and take the observed earnings surprise at face value, then the average recommendation prior to an earnings announcement should positively predict earningsannouncement-day returns. If, however, investors are perfectly aware of sell-side analysts' desire to report biased earnings forecasts and rationally respond to the bias component in the earnings surprise, no such return predictability should be observed.
As reported in Table III , recommendation levels and subsequent earnings-announcement-day returns are positively correlated, where earnings announcement day returns are DGTW characteristicadjusted returns in a three-day window around the annual earnings announcement. The coefficient estimate on the consensus recommendation level is 0.360 (t=4.07).
Our documented return predictability of lagged stock recommendations is distinct from prior findings that recent updates in recommendations predict future stock returns. As shown in Womack (1996) , recommendation revisions have essentially no return predictive power beyond the horizon of three months, whereas in our study we use (levels of) recommendations that are issued at least three months prior to earnings reports. In a placebo test, we use the average recommendation issued in months t-15 to t-3 to predict stock returns in month t, while ensuring that there is no annual earnings announcement between t-3 and t. There is no predictive power flowing from lagged recommendation levels to future stock returns outside the earnings-announcement period. This result further implies that the return predictability around earnings announcements is likely caused by analysts' strategic behavior rather than value-relevant information.
To further quantify the extent to which analysts with optimistic and pessimistic views are each responsible for the suggested bias in earnings forecasts, we conduct portfolio analyses. Specifically, in each year, we sort all firms into terciles based on their average outstanding recommendation level three months prior to the annual earnings announcement and report the average earnings surprise for each tercile portfolio. The consensus recommendation of the average firm in the bottom tercile is around three (a "hold"); the consensus recommendation of the average firm in the top tercile is around four and a half (the mid-point between a "buy" and a "strong buy").
As reported in Table IV , both high-and low-recommendation groups contribute to the observed association between consensus recommendations and subsequent earnings surprises. Firm-years in the tercile with the most pessimistic recommenations, on average, experience a price-scaled earnings surprise of -11 bps; in comparison, firm-years in the tercile with the most optimistic recommendations experience a price-scaled earnings surprise of +2 bps. The difference in price-scaled earnings surprise between the high-and low-recommendation groups is 13 basis points (t=2.50). Given the long-term average stock price of $35 per share (in the CRSP universe), the difference in price-scaled earnings surprise between the top and bottom terciles translates into a earnings surprise of 4 cents per share. Correspondingly, the fraction of firm-years meeting or beating the analyst consensus forecast is 7% higher in the top tercile than in the bottom tercile (t-statistic=9.06).
Recommendation levels and subsequent earnings-announcement-day returns again are positively correlated. Specifically, the average spread in DGTW characteristic-adjusted returns between the top and bottom tercile based on recommendation level is 67 basis points (t=4.95). In untabulated analyses, we also examine long-run returns. If part of the announcement-day returns is caused by investors not fully recognizing the bias in analysts' earnings forecasts associated with their recommendation level, we would expect some of the so-induced return effect to be reversed in the long run. Consistent with this conjecture, we observe a return reversal in the six-month period following the earnings announcement; specifically, the cumulative six-month DGTW characteristicadjusted return of the top tercile is 62 basis points below that of the bottom tercile in months four to nine following the earnings announcement. The difference, however, is only marginally statistically significant.
Additional Analyses -Determinants of the Bias
To further examine the mechanism underlying our results, we explore potential determinants of the extent to which analysts bias their reported earnings forecasts. We focus on two sets of firm characteristics. The first characteristic we examine is a firm's analyst coverage. Intuitively, the more analysts that are following a firm, the less each analyst's earnings forecast weighs in the consensus forecast upon which the earnings surprise is based. High analyst coverage also exacerbates the free-rider problem. To the extent that the analyst reporting a distorted earnings forecast is the only one to bear the cost, the more analysts that are covering a firm, the less likely any one of them would report distorted earnings estimates.
The second set of firm characteristics we examine, lagged firm size and stock-return volatility, are related to a stock's valuation uncertainty. 13 Our interpretation of the evidence so far is that analysts hedge their recommendations through biased earnings forecasts: Analysts with optimistic (pessimistic) recommendations worry that the firm subsequently experiences a negative (positive) earnings surprise and hedge against such risk by introducing a negative (positive) bias into their reported forecasts. Because firms with higher uncertainty have a wider range of potential earnings realizations, in order to "ensure" that these high uncertainty firms meet (miss) their consensus forecasts and experience positive (negative) earnings surprises, analysts have to report more biased forecasts (see figure below).
13 We compute stock-return volatility as in French et al. (1987) :
where Dt is the number of days in month t and r d is the return on day d. In an untabulated analysis, we explore alternative proxies for valuation uncertainty, including firm age, cash-flow volatility, book-to-market ratio and number of industry segments the firm operates in, with very similar results
To test our predictions, we re-estimate equation (3), but now include interaction terms between indicator variables of the aforementioned firm characteristics and the firm's consensus recommendation level prior to the earnings announcement:
where the indicator function, I (.) i,t , equals zero if the respective variable (except for analyst coverage) is in the bottom tercile of its distribution in a given year, one if the variable is in the middle tercile, and two otherwise. For analyst coverage, the indicator variable equals zero if coverage is one, one if coverage is between one and four, and two otherwise. We use absolute cutoff points because the average analyst coverage in a given year fluctuates throughout our sample period and our hypothesis speaks more to the absolute number of analysts covering the firm in question, rather than whether relative coverage in a given year is high or low. 14 The results are reported in Table V . Consistent with our hypothesis, the association between the average recommendation and subsequent earnings surprise significantly decreases with analyst coverage and increases with our proxies for valuation uncertainty. Specifically, the coefficient estimate on the analyst-coverage interaction term is -0.161 (t=-2.73), the estimate on the firm-size interaction term is -0.120 (t=-3.01), and the estimate on the return-volatility interaction term is 0.155 (t=1.87). All coefficient estimates are economically meaningful compared to the average effect of 0.287 reported in Table III . In particular, the association between average recommendation level and subsequent earnings surprise is indistinguishable from zero in the tercile with the highest analyst coverage, i.e., among firms that are, on average, followed by more than five analysts. The same qualification applies to firms in the largest size tercile and the lowest return-volatility tercile.
To better isolate the residual effect of each of the three variables (i.e., analyst coverage, firm size, and return volatility), we estimate a regression equation that includes interaction terms between the average recommendation and all three firm characteristics in the same specification. The results presented in the last column of Table V show that the coefficient estimate on the interaction term based on analyst coverage is -0.120 (t=-2.22); the coefficient estimates on the interaction terms based on return volatility and firm size are 0.132 (t=1.60) and -0.046 (t=-1.61), respectively.
The stronger association between earnings surprise and recommendation level when analyst coverage is low is consistent with the idea that the here proposed behavior requires coordination and sharing of both costs and benefits to be viable. To further explore this interpretation of the results, we partition the sample based on whether the analysts covering the firm in question work for brokerage houses that are based in the same locale. The argument is that geographic proximity facilitates coordination and we expect the association between recommendation and earnings surprise to be 14 Our results are robust when the analyst coverage indicator variable equals zero if coverage is in the bottom tercile of its distribution in a given year, one if coverage is in the middle tercile, and two otherwise. The results also continue to hold for alternate absolute cutoff points (Results are available upon request.).
stronger when the firm is covered by analysts from the same locale. We exclude brokerage houses located in New York City as our proposed channel is unlikely to apply to the New York City-area due to its high concentration of brokerage houses. 15 We extract brokerage firm names from the IBES Broker Translation File and match the names with the brokerage codes in the IBES dataset. We then manually collect each brokerage firm's location using a combination of Nelson's Directory of Investment Research, Manta, D&B Million Dollar Database, and the brokerage firm's website. Each brokerage firm's location is (then) assigned its Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA) or its ISO 3166-1 Country Code, if the brokerage firm is located outside the US. In the end, we are able to determine the brokerage firm's MSA/country for 98% of all observations. A firm is considered to be covered by analysts from the same locale if they all work for brokerage houses from the same MSA/non-US-country.
Panel A of Figure I reports the coefficient estimate on the consensus recommendation level for regression equation (3) estimated on the subsample of observations where analyst coverage equals one, the subsample where coverage is between two and four, and the subsample where coverage is greater than or equal to five. 16 The coefficient estimates are 0.563 (t=3.08), 0.114 (t=1.51), and 0.066 (t=1.73), respectively. Panel B further partitions the sample based on analyst locale. In the subsample for which a comparison can be made, i.e., for which there are both firms covered exclusively by analysts from the same locale and firms covered by analysts from different locales, the coefficient estimate is higher when analysts are from the same locale than when they are not:
Within the subsample where coverage is between two and four, the partial correlation coefficient between earnings surprise and recommendation level is 0.103 for analysts from different locales, but 0.222 for analysts from the same locale. 17
15 By looking at brokerage house locations, we impose the assumption that the majority of analysts in our sample are based in their respective brokerage houses' headquarters; this assumption appears reasonable given the exclusion of New York-area brokerage firms and the ensuing focus on regional brokerage firms in our analysis.
16 In other words, we plot the coefficient estimateβ on the average recommendation level from our baseline regression (3) estimated for various subsamples.
17 For the subsample where coverage is greater than or equal to five, the partial correlation coefficient between earnings surprise and recommendation level is higher for the subset of firms covered exclusively by analysts from the same locale. However, less than 1% of observations are covered exclusively by analysts from the same locale,
Additional Analyses -Marginal Analyst
Before turning to our final set of analyses, we investigate recommendations of analysts revising their earnings forecasts shortly before the earnings announcement. Specifically, we focus on the last analyst updating his/her earnings forecast before actual earnings are announced and examine cases where these last-minute downward (upward) revisions lower (raise) the consensus forecast and ex post produce a positive (negative) earnings surprise that, without the last-minute revision, would have been a negative (positive) earnings surprise.
Because earnings forecast revisions are determined by value-relevant information, analysts downward -revising their earnings forecasts may be expected to have lower levels of recommendations outstanding than analysts upward -revising their earnings forecasts. However, (1) if analysts revise their earnings forecasts, at the last minute, not only because of value-relevant information, but also to hedge their recommendations and avoid "contradictory" earnings surprises, and (2) if the latter channel is economically meaningful, we may observe that downward-revising analysts have more positive recommendations outstanding than upward-revising analysts.
In the data, we find that the average level of recommendation of last-minute downward revisers is 3.8, whereas the average level of recommendation of last-minute upward revisers is 3.7. That is, the average level of recommendations is higher for analysts downward -revising their earnings forecasts shortly before the earnings announcement than for analysts upward -revising their earnings forecasts. 18 Focusing on the subset of firms covered by one analyst only (where we expect our proposed mechanism to be the strongest), we detect that the average level of recommendation of analysts downward -revising their earnings forecasts shortly before the earnings announcement (and the company subsequently experiencing a positive earnings surprise that without this last minute downward-revision would have been a negative earnings surprise) is 3.9, whereas the average preventing a meaningful comparison.
18 Because earnings forecast revisions are also determined by value-relevant information, analysts downward -revising their earnings forecasts may be expected to have lower levels of recommendations outstanding than analysts upwardrevising their earnings forecasts. Thus, comparing the difference in recommendation between the two groups with regard to zero understates the significance of our result.
level of recommendation of analysts upward -revising their earnings forecasts shortly before the earnings announcement (and the company subsequently experiencing a negative earnings surprise that without this last minute upward-revision would have been a positive earnings surprise) is 3.6.
The 0.3-difference is economically meaningful and statistically different from zero.
Investors' Trading Behavior
In this section, we explore which investor group is more likely to be misled by distortions in analysts' earnings forecasts. Prior studies (e.g., Daniel et al. (2002); Schotter (2003) ; Malmendier and Shanthikumar (2007) ) suggest that retail investors, naïve about incentives, are particularly vulnerable to agents' strategic behavior. We therefore expect retail investors to buy (sell) on the part of the positive (negative) earnings surprise that is induced by analysts' strategic behavior.
To test our prediction, we re-estimate equation (3) 
Alternative Interpretations and Robustness Checks
This section discusses a number of alternative interpretations of our findings. The dependent variable in equation (3) -the difference between reported consensus forecast and actual earnings -can be decomposed into a forecast-bias component and a true earnings-surprise component:
T rue Earnings Surprise ,
where e rep i,t+1 is the reported consensus forecast, e i,t+1 is the true (yet unobserved) consensus forecast, and e i,t+1 is the reported earnings. Alternative interpretations of (some of) our findings arise because forecasts may be biased for reasons other than to ensure consistent earnings surprises, yet in a fashion that correlates with recommendation levels.
Earnings Management and Forecast Guidance
Firms with more optimistic recommendations may have stronger incentives to manage earnings upward, as they are penalized more severely for missing their earnings targets; these firms also have stronger incentives to guide analyst forecasts downward. In contrast, firms with more pessimistic recommendations may be more inclined to take big earnings baths. To the extent that financial analysts do not fully correct for the effect of earnings management and allow their forecasts to be guided, firm management can induce a positive correlation between recommendation level and Earnings Surprise.
To address this possibility, in our regression analyses, we explicitly control for earnings management using discretionary accruals and variables intended to capture earnings-management and earnings-guidance incentives (firm size, past returns, book-to-market ratio, investment ratio). We observe that our results are robust to the inclusion of these variables. In addition, neither the earnings-management nor forecast-guidance interpretation has clear predictions on how the observed effect should vary with analyst coverage, analyst locale, and valuation uncertainty. The forecast-guidance story by itself also is less likely to explain negative earnings surprises associated with pessimistic recommendations.
Currying Favor with Firm Managers
Lin and McNichols (1998), Michaely and Womack (1999) , and Richardson et al. (2004) , among others, provide evidence that analysts tend to curry favor with management by issuing overly optimistic stock recommendations and beatable earnings forecasts. In particular, Malmendier and
Shanthikumar (2009) The currying-favor channel has difficulty explaining why both the more negative and the more positive recommendations contribute to our result; it also has no clear prediction on the interaction effect with analyst coverage, analyst locale and valuation uncertainty. In addition, the currying favor mechanism more speaks to analysts' relative views within the same firm (i.e., differences in forecasting behavior between affiliated and unaffiliated analysts covering the same firm (Malmendier and Shanthikumar (2009))). The main results of this paper, on the other hand, are based on acrossfirm analyses.
Nevertheless, in additional analyses, we collect data from the SDC New Issues database to determine whether the analyst's employer was a lead or co-underwriter of an initial public offering (IPO) in the past five years or of a seasoned equity offering (SEO) in the past two years. We (then) re-estimate our baseline regression, but now include the fraction of analysts who are affiliated with the firm in question as an additional independent variable. The inclusion of the affiliation variable does not alter the coefficient estimate on the average recommendation level: The coefficient estimate becomes 0.270 (t=3.41). For comparison, the estimate reported in Table III equals 0.287 (t=3.47).
We also include an interaction term between the fraction of affiliated analysts and recommendation level; the coefficient on this interaction term is close to zero and not statistically significant.
The predictions of our main hypothesis and those of alternative explanations are listed in Appendix C. 20 Our goal in this paper is not to cast doubt on these alternative explanations. Rather, we hope to introduce a novel mechanism through which analysts -in an attempt to appear accurate/consistent -in fact give up earnings forecast accuracy. While difficult to prove conclusively, all of the results presented in this study are at the very least consistent with this view of analyst behavior. Moreover, while all of the alternative explanations likely play a role in explaining parts of our findings, neither can explain the full set of results by itself, making our interpretation perhaps the most parsimonious.
Robustness Checks
In our last set of analyses, we perform a number of additional specification and robustness checks.
First, we use an alternative definition of analysts' consensus earnings forecast. Specifically, following Richardson et al. (2004) , among others, we define the consensus earnings forecast as the median (rather than the mean) forecast across all analysts with valid earnings forecasts issued within three months prior to the annual earnings announcement, and then re-estimate regression equation (3) with this alternative measure. The results reported in Panel A of Table VII are virtually unchanged from those in Table III 
Conclusion
We conjecture that analysts issue biased earnings forecasts in a direction that helps "confirm" their outstanding stock recommendations. In particular, we hypothesize that analysts with optimistic (pessimistic) recommendations are concerned that their firm subsequently experience a negative (positive) earnings surprise, which could be construed as contradicting their bullish (bearish) views on the company and raise doubt on their competency; to hedge against such risk, analysts introduce a negative (positive) bias into their reported forecasts.
The results presented in this study are consistent with our hypothesis. Firms with more op-21 For the purpose of comparison, we also include results based on the mean forecast in the same Panel.
timistic average recommendations prior to earnings announcements experience significantly more positive earnings surprises and announcement-day returns. The effect is stronger among firms with low analyst coverage, coverage by analysts from the same locale, and high valuation uncertainty.
Combined, these findings suggest that, sometimes, analysts -in an attempt to appear accurate and consistent -de facto give up earnings forecast accuracy. 22 In rare cases, the autocorrelation in returns is less than -0.5 and the variance estimate is negative. For these stocks, the variance estimator is the sum of squared daily returns only. (1) and (3), the dependent variable is the difference between the actual EPS and the consensus EPS forecast scaled by (lagged) price. In columns (2) and (4), the dependent variable is an indicator that actual EPS is greater than or equal to the consensus EPS forecast. The independent variables are: Recommendation Level, defined to be the firm's consensus recommendation level three months prior to the earnings announcement. Other (untabulated) independent variables include: Size, defined to be the logarithm of the firm's market capitalization (in million$); Book-to-Market Ratio, defined to be the logarithm of the firm's book-to-market ratio; Past Returns, defined to be the firm's cumulative oneyear stock return prior to the earnings announcement; and Discretionary Accruals, as defined in Appendix B. In columns (1) and (3) 
Recommendation and Earnings Surprise
This figure presents estimates from pooled regressions of the difference between actual EPS and consensus EPS forecasts on recommendation levels (on a firm/year-level) for various analyst coverage-subsamples. The sample includes all firms with valid recommendations and EPS forecasts in IBES over the period 1994 to 2010. The dependent variable is the difference between the actual EPS and the consensus EPS forecast scaled by (lagged) price. The independent variables are: Recommendation Level, defined to be the firm's consensus recommendation level three months prior to the earnings announcement. Other (untabulated) independent variables include: Size, defined to be the logarithm of the firm's market capitalization (in million$); Book-to-Market Ratio, defined to be the logarithm of the firm's book-tomarket ratio; Past Returns, defined to be the firm's cumulative one-year stock return prior to the earnings announcement; and Discretionary Accruals, as defined in Appendix B. A firm is defined to be from the "same locale" if all analysts covering the firm are based from a brokerage house in the same metropolitan statistical area (excluding New York). All coefficient estimates are multiplied by 100. T- 
